The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C.
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- Author：Robert Drews
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Summary
The Bronze Age came to a close early in the twelfth century b。c。 with one of the worst calamities in history: over a period of several decades， destruction descended upon key cities throughout the Eastern Mediterranean， bringing to an end the Levantine， Hittite， Trojan， and Mycenaean kingdoms and plunging some lands into a dark age that would last more than four hundred years。 In his attempt to account for this destruction， Robert Drews rejects the traditional explanations and proposes a military one instead。
Reviews
Epichan
，
Tunç çağının büyük bir yıkım ile sonlanmasını konu alıyor kitap。 Deniz kavimlerinin bir an ortaya çıkması ve tunç çağı imparatorluklarını yok etmesini farklı bir bakış açısı ile anlatmakta。 Daha fazlası için;http://bit。ly/3cpKNFp Tunç çağının büyük bir yıkım ile sonlanmasını konu alıyor kitap。 Deniz kavimlerinin bir an ortaya çıkması ve tunç çağı imparatorluklarını yok etmesini farklı bir bakış açısı ile anlatmakta。 Daha fazlası için;http://bit。ly/3cpKNFp 。。。more
Nathan Albright
，
This book is almost perfect， almost， but not quite。 As is all too often the case， a great deal of professional historians like the author are simultaneously dependent on the Bible for critical evidence about ancient history and resentful of that fact and desirous of a way of undercutting the historical value of the Old Testament while simultaneously remaining dependent on it [1]。 Were it not for this attitude this book would be entirely praiseworthy as a work， even though it does depend at lea This book is almost perfect， almost， but not quite。 As is all too often the case， a great deal of professional historians like the author are simultaneously dependent on the Bible for critical evidence about ancient history and resentful of that fact and desirous of a way of undercutting the historical value of the Old Testament while simultaneously remaining dependent on it [1]。 Were it not for this attitude this book would be entirely praiseworthy as a work， even though it does depend at least somewhat on speculation and is more venturesome than most books of its kind when it comes to seeking an explanation of why it was that the Bronze era of chariot empires in the Levant ended so catastrophically as it did， and caused centuries of dark ages in various places。 This is a work that， like those hordes that swept clean the Middle East and Anatolia and Southern Europe of many cities of high civilization， this book not only promotes a theory but seeks （generally successfully） to sweep the field of a great many theories that have attempted to explain this Bronze Age collapse without invoking the necessity of a profound military explanation。This book is about 200 pages long and is divided into fourteen chapters。 After a list of illustrations， acknowledgements， and abbreviations， the book begins with a two-chapter introduction （I）， where the author discusses the catastrophe at the end of the Bronze Age and its chronology （1） and also provides a survey of that catastrophe in Anatolia， Cyprus， Syria， the southern Levant， Mesopotamia， Egypt， Greece and the Aegean Islands， and Crete （2）。 After that the author examines alternate hypotheses to the author's own for the catastrophe and subjects them to severe criticism （II）， such as earthquakes （3）， migrations， with a particular look at the evidence from Egyptian sources （4）， ironworking （5）， drought （6）， systems collapse （7）， and raiders （8）， the last of which the author gives at least partial credit to。 Finally， the author provides a military explanation of the catastrophe （III）， prefacing it with cautions （9）， discussing the chariot warfare of the Late Bronze Age， including how chariots were used and the battles of Megiddo and Kadesh （10）， discussing the role of infantrymen in chariot warfare， their recruitment， and a view of the role of infantry in the catastrophe （11）， discussing infantry and cavalry in the early Iron Age that followed （12）， discussing the change in armor and weapons in the early Iron Age， including javelins， spears， and lances， as well as swords （13）， and discussing the end of chariot warfare in the catastrophe （14）， after which there is a bibliography and index。This book does two things that I think are very interesting and noteworthy as far as speculative history is concerned。 Aside from the author's lamentable （if predictable） anti-biblical bias， the historian is to be praised for admitting that the evidence for his theories is slight。 To be sure， the evidence is not insignificant， especially when it comes to the technology of swords that are capable of cutting and slashing and the development of a heavy-infantry ethos that made the Bronze Age dependence on expensive chariot archers obsolete。 That said， the author is open about the ignorance that we have about the world of the late Bronze Age， and that honesty is to be celebrated and appreciated， as it makes a concession that some would dare to use against the author's thesis。 In addition， the author does a good job at carefully reading sources （aside from the Bible， where he inexplicably falls prey to errors of conflation） and demonstrating both the small scale of armies in the Late Bronze Age Levant as well as the avoidance of making appeals to massive population transfers that are not necessary to account for the fall of the Hittites and archaic Greeks as well as smaller civilizations from Ugarit to Cyprus as well as the near-defeat of Egypt。 As a result this is a book that deserves to be read， if critically， and whose views （aside from the Bible） deserve to be taken seriously。[1] See， for example:https://edgeinducedcohesion。blog/2015。。。https://edgeinducedcohesion。blog/2015。。。 。。。more
Brian
，
Robert Drews suggests a new explanation for the collapse of city states and palace economies that defined the end of the Bronze Age， one based not in ecological， technological， or demographic factors， but rather upon a revolution in battlefield tactics。 Faced with the paucity of documentary descriptions of Late Bronze war-craft， the author draws inferences from archaeological， pictorial， and epigraphic evidence to outline his thesis。 After refuting competing theories of the collapse， Drews propo Robert Drews suggests a new explanation for the collapse of city states and palace economies that defined the end of the Bronze Age， one based not in ecological， technological， or demographic factors， but rather upon a revolution in battlefield tactics。 Faced with the paucity of documentary descriptions of Late Bronze war-craft， the author draws inferences from archaeological， pictorial， and epigraphic evidence to outline his thesis。 After refuting competing theories of the collapse， Drews proposes that we must rethink the composition of standing armies in the Late Bronze Age， when not massed infantry， but rank upon rank of chariot-borne archers were at the core of conventional warfare。 In fact， Drews argues， the sudden appearance of roving marauders successfully razing city after city around the turn of the 12th millennium BCE must be attributed to the relatively sudden realization among mercenary footsoldiers from the fringes of the Mediterranean's urban civilizations that the horse-drawn fleets of their former employers were especially vulnerable to their own javelin volleys and skirmishing swordsmen。 The root cause of the Bronze Age collapse， then， was essentially a revolution in the tactics of war， from which further changes in weaponry， military composition， and social organization derived; those states who weathered the storm， or at least managed to rebuild after it had passed， were those who recognized and adapted to this fundamental change。 。。。more
Winston Underwood
，
Very dry， but if that's your thing you'll like this book！ Probably not for the casual reader， but hobby historians will enjoy this。 Very dry， but if that's your thing you'll like this book！ Probably not for the casual reader， but hobby historians will enjoy this。 。。。more
Dawid Łaziński
，
Drews takes on one of the major mysteries of ancient history， namely the Bronze Age Collapse。 It was an obscure process， lasting for a couple of decades and disastrously affecting the whole Eastern Mediterranean basin。 It took place in the 12th century BCE effectively wiping off most signs of civilisation and organised statehood from the region。 Few had come out of it relatively unharmed like Egypt but even they later recounted the story with great concern。 Others， like Hittites， Mycenaean Greek Drews takes on one of the major mysteries of ancient history， namely the Bronze Age Collapse。 It was an obscure process， lasting for a couple of decades and disastrously affecting the whole Eastern Mediterranean basin。 It took place in the 12th century BCE effectively wiping off most signs of civilisation and organised statehood from the region。 Few had come out of it relatively unharmed like Egypt but even they later recounted the story with great concern。 Others， like Hittites， Mycenaean Greeks or Ugarit had less luck and simply ceased to exist。 Although many hypotheses have been put forward， a massive volcano eruption to name one， extant sources blame this calamity unequivocally on the Sea People。The author wants to find out who were those mysterious warriors， where did they come from and what was their motivation to gang together， travel great distances and wreck havoc。 Was it pure rapacity or maybe they too were pressed by some even more menacing peoples。 And finally， what had changed that allowed hitherto unthreatening tribes to gain such an upper hand as to literally force several centuries old civilisations to oblivion。Drews argues that it was the new mode of warfare that made the difference。 The “older” states built their armies predominantly upon chariot riders equipped with bows with infantry’s role being only secondary。 Out of sudden they had to face swarms of foot warriors fighting with double-edged swords。 The tactics that had so far worked against the comparable armies now failed。 The material used to forge weapons also proved crucial。 While bronze is indeed a resilient alloy， iron turned out to be much more readily available。 One of bronze’s component is tin which was very hard to come by and required long distance trade routes which only large empires could afford。 Contrarily iron allowed for a much more democratised weapon making rendering large armies of relatively well armed men accessible even to underdeveloped states。When put this way the topic may seam quite appealing， unfortunately Drews’ writing turns out very demanding and scholarly。 。。。more
Tim Pendry
，
One of the mysteries of early human history is the near-complete collapse of Bronze Age civilisation in the West around 1200BC。 The Mycenaean and Hittite Empires collapsed， the Canaanite and Syrian cities were plundered， Egypt was severely threatened by hordes from the Libyan West and only Assyria survived intact。This would be like some upheaval destroying civilisation in Europe and Russia and forcing all world trade centres out of business， leaving only China standing and a weakened US。 What ca One of the mysteries of early human history is the near-complete collapse of Bronze Age civilisation in the West around 1200BC。 The Mycenaean and Hittite Empires collapsed， the Canaanite and Syrian cities were plundered， Egypt was severely threatened by hordes from the Libyan West and only Assyria survived intact。This would be like some upheaval destroying civilisation in Europe and Russia and forcing all world trade centres out of business， leaving only China standing and a weakened US。 What caused this has been a puzzle for generations of archaeologists。Robert Drews， writing a quarter of a century ago， came up with a very plausible solution in this book， taking account of one simple problem - we cannot know very much about this era。 In the end， his solutions seems the most plausible largely because all other solutions are less so。He takes us through all those formerly plausible scenarios that do not quite stand up to scrutiny - tectonic shifts causing devastating earthquakes， mass migrations of peoples （caused perhaps by， say， over-population）， the arrival of ironworking， climatic change and general systems collapse。His solution is more brutally simple - changes in basic military technology which triggered a change in the relative power of 'primitives' in the hinterland， used to doing imperial dirty work or hungry for the goodies that the empires and cities held， to 'civilisation'。 There is no point on over-simplifying his argument。 The slim evidential base is nevertheless handled with skill to place a great deal of emphasis on the arrival of the slashing sword invented to the North and which gave tribes throughout the region a new edge against chariot warfare。His argument provides a plausible narrative in which mercenaries are hired and then become factors （as in Rome many centuries later） in disturbing the balance of power on which empires depend。 Unlike the later barbarians， these 'primitives' were happy just to plunder and not to learn。Drew calls these events the Catastrophe but points out that it was these plundering tribes who eventually learned to cohere in the Iron Age into 'nations' that were the founding twin poles of later Western civilisation， Greece and Israel。 There is much to ponder here （if one is so minded） on what may cause the collapse of civilisations。 Eco-causes are fashionable on the left and migration pressures on the right but it may be that both are allowing ideology and prejudice to get in the way。Even new technology， the current favourite for renewed torment amongst the terminal pessimists， may not be the probable cause that we are told。 Perhaps it is just going to be about the transfer of very specific tools to the 'damned of the earth'， a simple shift in power relations。In 1200BC， the slashing sword and a few other highly specific innovations and new motivations in the hands of masses of men seem to have overcome the capital-intensive military technologies of the day - the chariot army and its logistics - surprisingly quickly and brutally。The masses of men were outsiders who had been brought into the system to act as mercenaries and seem to have learned of the weaknesses of their employers and enemies。 Drews give some emphasis to the role of an attempted mass assault on Egypt by the Libyans as central to the learning process。I cannot quite see a modern analogy but we might be interested in looking for it。 Who are the masses of persons today who are allowed to taste the system but not to own it？ What tools are to hand that would give them the edge over the finely honed 'educated' and wealthier 'owners'？Perhaps then it was a struggle over brute force - the ability to thrust aside the other and plunder。 Perhaps today civilisation is vulnerable not to such thuggery but to a simple withdrawal of an acceptance of elite legitimacy enabled by some new and forthcoming single techno-innovation。The pessimists always think that the collapse of civilisation is due at any time。 They are usually wrong。 However， Chinese and Western history have shown periodic periods of collapse and restoration。 It is probably worth thinking about what could cause the next collapse if it ever came。 。。。more
Cem Yüksel
，
MÖ 12。yüzyılda Anadolu ve Akdeniz havzasındaki refah ve Kadeş gibi savaşlar sonrası göreceli barış devrini ortadan kaldıran ve o dönemin büyük krallıklarının merkezleri Hattuşa， Mykenai， Truva， Ugarit ， Thebai gibi büyük şehirlerin yıkılmasına yol açan genel bir felaketin nedenini araştıran bir kitap。 Genelde yakılarak yok olan bu şehirler için ortaya sürülen deprem， sistemin çöküşü veya kuzeyden gelen kavimler göçünü takip eden deniz kavimleri teorisini kabul etmeyen Drews， bunun silah teknoloj MÖ 12。yüzyılda Anadolu ve Akdeniz havzasındaki refah ve Kadeş gibi savaşlar sonrası göreceli barış devrini ortadan kaldıran ve o dönemin büyük krallıklarının merkezleri Hattuşa， Mykenai， Truva， Ugarit ， Thebai gibi büyük şehirlerin yıkılmasına yol açan genel bir felaketin nedenini araştıran bir kitap。 Genelde yakılarak yok olan bu şehirler için ortaya sürülen deprem， sistemin çöküşü veya kuzeyden gelen kavimler göçünü takip eden deniz kavimleri teorisini kabul etmeyen Drews， bunun silah teknolojisi ve savaş stilindeki değişiklikten kaynaklandığını， savaş arabaları ile savaşan bu krallıkların kesici uzun kılıçlı yaya saldırganlara direnemediklerini ， bu guruhun başka kavimler değil， bölgedeki zor şartlarda yaşayan ， paralı askerlik yapan ， güçlerini görünce ganimet kovalayan bölgenin barbarları olduğunu anlatıyor。 Demirin tunçun yerini aldığı ， teknoloji ve savunma sistemlerinde o gün ve bugün başlangıçta farkedilemeyecek bir değişimin， koca Akdeniz havzasını nasıl asırlarca karanlığa gömdüğünü görmek açısından çok ilginç bir kitap。 Bugünün oturmuş yapıları ， hızlı hareket eden küçük oyuncuları ile bir çok iş dünyası veya politik çıkarımın yapılabileceği bir anlatım。 Drews bir çok noktada akıl yürütme ile eski teorileri boşa çıkartıyor。 Gerçi tarih bulunan her antik parça ile değişime uğrayabileceği için ， bu teori de ileride anlamsız kalabilir ama şu andaki çıkarımlar akla yakın。 Detaylı arkeolojik karşılaştırmalar içerdiği için， konuya ilgisi olanlar için keyifli bir kitap。 。。。more
Del
，
The author cherry-picks the evidence to put together a theory on subjects he has little knowledge or understanding of， dismissing anything that doesn't fit his personal viewpoint。 The author cherry-picks the evidence to put together a theory on subjects he has little knowledge or understanding of， dismissing anything that doesn't fit his personal viewpoint。 。。。more
Valiant Thor
，
This book is a bit on the academic side， but still quite readable。 The author's hypothesis is sound and well-supported， and the book in general does a good job of painting a picture of the Bronze Age world and its collapse。 I became aware of this book due to it being referenced in the excellent book "The Ancient Mines of Kitchi-Gummi"， the subject of which is the Bronze Age trans-Atlantic copper trade。 A book worth reading for those interested in the Bronze Age in general and/or the Michigan cop This book is a bit on the academic side， but still quite readable。 The author's hypothesis is sound and well-supported， and the book in general does a good job of painting a picture of the Bronze Age world and its collapse。 I became aware of this book due to it being referenced in the excellent book "The Ancient Mines of Kitchi-Gummi"， the subject of which is the Bronze Age trans-Atlantic copper trade。 A book worth reading for those interested in the Bronze Age in general and/or the Michigan copper that enabled it。 。。。more
Jon Debruin
，
I am new to this area of history， but I feel like he was unable to prove his thesis in some areas。 He claimed that his thesis was what few other scholars believed。 Starting off that puts me at a smaller chance of believing his claim。 He also had to assume a lot from the data since it is scattered and from long ago。 With the lack of evidence for his claim and being apart from the mass amount of scholars it was difficult to believe him fully。 Other than that the book was not to dry， it was interes I am new to this area of history， but I feel like he was unable to prove his thesis in some areas。 He claimed that his thesis was what few other scholars believed。 Starting off that puts me at a smaller chance of believing his claim。 He also had to assume a lot from the data since it is scattered and from long ago。 With the lack of evidence for his claim and being apart from the mass amount of scholars it was difficult to believe him fully。 Other than that the book was not to dry， it was interesting and makes a compelling argument despite himself。 。。。more
Bruce Fogerty
，
I became interested in this period of Eastern Mediterranean history when I read First & Second Samuel in the Bible。 The end of the bronze age occurred in about 1200 BC and led to a four hundred year long period of dark ages。 This book reviews multiple theories as to the cause of the fall of Late Bronze Age Civilization。 These theories are frustratingly short of hard， irrefutable evidence do to the distance in time these events occurred。 This book is not for the reader with a casual interest in h I became interested in this period of Eastern Mediterranean history when I read First & Second Samuel in the Bible。 The end of the bronze age occurred in about 1200 BC and led to a four hundred year long period of dark ages。 This book reviews multiple theories as to the cause of the fall of Late Bronze Age Civilization。 These theories are frustratingly short of hard， irrefutable evidence do to the distance in time these events occurred。 This book is not for the reader with a casual interest in history。 It clearly was written for professional academic historians， and those who are hardcore amateurs。 。。。more
Jon Jucovy
，
This was a brilliant forensic takedown of various theories of the Catastrophe， replaced with a convincing explanation that focused on changes in warfare。 The book changed， probably forever， much of what I thought was "true" about the advent of the "Dark Ages"。 This was a brilliant forensic takedown of various theories of the Catastrophe， replaced with a convincing explanation that focused on changes in warfare。 The book changed， probably forever， much of what I thought was "true" about the advent of the "Dark Ages"。 。。。more
AskHistorians
，
This is the only halfway decent book on the Bronze Age collapse that affected Greece， Anatolia， and Syria。 Drews' rebuttal of some widely-accepted theories on the collapse is the most useful part。 His own argument， that the collapse was caused by changes in military practice， is much less useful （though his theory is at least no worse than its competitors）。 This is the only halfway decent book on the Bronze Age collapse that affected Greece， Anatolia， and Syria。 Drews' rebuttal of some widely-accepted theories on the collapse is the most useful part。 His own argument， that the collapse was caused by changes in military practice， is much less useful （though his theory is at least no worse than its competitors）。 。。。more
Alix Amnamare
，
This is a slim book， but an important one， for anyone interested in the Bronze Age Collapse。 Drews fills in a small but important gap in the data with a well-supported argument that an important change in warfare - the increased use of javelins - caused the Collapse to be as destructive as it was。I would also say that this is also a good book to use as an overview for the Collapse - what it is， how far it spread， what the basic theories are。 His first section is quite a useful little guide。
Emily
，
Survey of archaeological evidence of the events around the Bronze Age collapse。 Drews ruthlessly demolishes the Victorian-era migrations and earthquakes explanations for the Catastrophe。But his smugness in dismissing climate change and systems collapse is unwarranted。 Without even looking at the past twenty years of scholarship， a reader can see that Drews's objection to these explanations is circular: drought and social turmoil can't raze palaces， and the Catastrophe is the destruction of Bronz Survey of archaeological evidence of the events around the Bronze Age collapse。 Drews ruthlessly demolishes the Victorian-era migrations and earthquakes explanations for the Catastrophe。But his smugness in dismissing climate change and systems collapse is unwarranted。 Without even looking at the past twenty years of scholarship， a reader can see that Drews's objection to these explanations is circular: drought and social turmoil can't raze palaces， and the Catastrophe is the destruction of Bronze Age palaces， ergo， those explanations are patently faulty， he says。The second half of the book runs to detailed speculation about the decline of chariot warfare， the arms and armor resulting from this change， and alternate readings of ancient texts （including the Mahabarata and the Old Testament） supporting the thesis that the Catastrophe was the direct result of new military tactics。 For myself， I'm attracted to a thesis where a combination of factors contributed to the collapse， and I don't think Drews's observations are inconsistent with a scenario where drought stressed the population， and the palace cultures' wealth， being tied up in chariot squadrons， was unable to be shifted to adequate defenses against advances in weapons technology。http://www。abc。net。au/local/stories/2。。。http://www。academia。edu/355153/2003_C。。。 。。。more
Steve
，
The mortuary temple of Ramesses III on whose northern wall is a huge mural depicting the victory of Ramses III and the Egyptians over the "Sea People" around 1190 （or 1179， depending upon the expert） BCE。A little after 1200 BCE most of the thriving cities around the eastern Mediterranean were burnt to the ground， abandoned or reduced to a shadow of their former selves， including Mycenae， Thebes and Tiryns on the Grecian peninsula， Knossos on Crete，（*） and Troy in western Anatolia， to mention o The mortuary temple of Ramesses III on whose northern wall is a huge mural depicting the victory of Ramses III and the Egyptians over the "Sea People" around 1190 （or 1179， depending upon the expert） BCE。A little after 1200 BCE most of the thriving cities around the eastern Mediterranean were burnt to the ground， abandoned or reduced to a shadow of their former selves， including Mycenae， Thebes and Tiryns on the Grecian peninsula， Knossos on Crete，（*） and Troy in western Anatolia， to mention only names which are widely known。 The worst of this Catastrophe， as Robert Drews terms it， appears to have taken place in eastern Anatolia， Syria and the southern Levant， according to an illustration in this book。 Mesopotamia was not affected （apparently it was too far inland）， but the Egyptians had to fight for their lives at least twice between 1208 and 1176 BCE and managed to defeat the marauders they called the "Sea People"。 Nonetheless， the Egyptians were sufficiently weakened that their empire began to contract; the victories over the Sea People were the swan song of the New Kingdom。Above is a photo of the very well preserved mortuary temple of Ramesses III， on whose northern wall is a mural depicting one of the battles between the Egyptians and the Sea People， including a very brief description of the event in which the term "Sea People" appears。 Much longer descriptions have been found on papyri。 Directly below is an artistic reconstruction of that wall mural。But see also this link for a larger， clearer version of this image。The result was a Dark Age which lasted as long as 400 years on the Grecian peninsula， where the light began to shine again in the age of the Homeric poets， but was shorter lived elsewhere。Who did all this destruction， and how could they have been so powerful that only the greatest imperial power in the region could defeat them in open combat？ This is the question posed in Robert Drews' The End of the Bronze Age （1993）， which I read in order to get a clearer picture of what is known currently about the Catastrophe itself， since what I know dates back to books written in the 60's and 70's。 Drews' answer to these questions - the introduction of innovations in military technology and tactics- is the primary focus of this book， hence the subtitle Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca。 1200 B。C。， but first he reviews alternate explanations and reveals some of the more recent knowledge about the Catastrophe I was looking for。Drews' discussion of earlier conjectures offered by other archaeologists and historians - earthquakes， migrations， ironworking， droughts and "systems collapse" - is scholarly and not polemic。 He does not discount the possibility that any of these may have made a （very） small contribution to the Catastrophe， but he argues compellingly that none could have accounted for the Catastrophe by itself。 This portion of the book I found to be particularly interesting， since Drews reviews the evidence and arguments for and against all the major "explanations" and， in the process， digs out of monographs and articles from the specialist literature what one actually knows about the Catastrophe。In the second half of the book Drews turns to his own proposal。 On the basis of relatively recent research by specialists， he had already discussed in detail the nature of warfare in the ancient Near East and the Aegean in The Coming of the Greeks: Indo-European Conquests in the Aegean and the Near East （1988）。 It had already been known for a good while that land war in that time and place was carried out primarily by fleets of chariots （mentioned already in Moses I。 Finley's The World of Odysseus （1954））（**） carrying bowmen armed with composite bows。 There he proposed that the war chariot became militarily significant in the 17th century BCE， dominating warfare from Greece and Crete to northwestern India。 Although the infantry of the time was very nearly helpless against the chariot， both the chariot and the composite bow were intricate objects， requiring specialist knowledge to construct， and hence expensive。 In addition， the charioteer and bowman needed a great deal of training to function well together。 So only rulers with extensive resources could mount large fleets of war chariots。 In the 13th century a Hittite king fielded 3，500 chariots in a battle against the Egyptians。 Then， when the role of the infantry declined to the point of negligibility and the chariots had only the enemy chariots as their targets， the crew and horses needed armor， and later also a third crewman carrying a shield to protect driver and bowman - the well known escalation of the cost of warfare。Drews' primary thesis in this book is that 1200 BCE marked the end of dominance of the war chariot， when a simultaneous advance in both tactics and battle weaponry returned the advantage to the infantry， who were significantly less expensive that the war chariots。 Hence were the smaller polities now at an advantage with respect to the larger， and all over the eastern Mediterranean palaces fell and cities burned。 He amasses much evidence that the use of chariot and composite bow， prevalent everywhere before 1200 BCE became relatively scarce in the region in question， while the long sword， available nowhere before 1200 BCE except in the Balkans， was found everywhere afterwards。 That these changes occurred at the same time as the Catastrophe is suggestive。The new weapon was the bronze long sword; though it is a formidable weapon， this alone could not stop the chariot armies。 A long range weapon was needed， and that would be the javelin or the bow， both of which were in use before。 So what was the new element？ Drews doesn't know， though he suggests on the basis of Egyptian records that overwhelming numbers of skirmishing infantrymen were the key。。。 Drews admits explicitly that he is guessing here。One may well doubt that the adventurers in the hinterlands could come together in sufficient numbers， but according to Egyptian records precisely that occurred on at least two different occasions。 Summoning adventurers from all over the Aegean， the king of Libya brought an army numbering at least 20，000 into the Egyptian delta。 Drews thinks that elsewhere， where the obstacles were not so great to the invaders as in Egypt， encouraged by news of similar successes elsewhere， the peoples driven into the mountains by the polities in the plains descended upon the cities and sacked them。 Maybe。。。 Drews has left open many questions， and this can hardly be a surprise given the distance in time of the events one is attempting to understand。 But in this book he provides insight into what specialists have learned about the Catastrophe， and it is certainly much more than was known 50 years ago。The End of the Bronze Age， published by the Princeton University Press， is a heavily footnoted academic book in which the author does not provide translations for his quotes from German， French and Italian authors。（*） This is under debate by the experts， since they are not certain when Knossos was burnt to the ground。 Drews gives an argument why the old date of early 14th century BCE is wrong。 But whenever Knossos was burnt， violence and a complete change of settlement patterns changed on all of Crete at the beginning of the 12th century。 （**） As an aside， Drews confirms with further details how un-Mycenaean the warfare in the Iliad was。 During the Dark Age the Greek oral tradition had forgotten most of the Mycenaean period。 Rating http://leopard。booklikes。com/post/957。。。 。。。more
Aaron Arnold
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A fascinating look at the history of the Bronze Age collapse， one of the least-known but most pivotal periods in history。 Even though the invasions of the Sea Peoples were so devastating that there aren't even records of their proper name， and despite the passage of over thirty centuries and the disappearance of most of the historical record， Drews reviews the greater part of the known evidence of the battles that the eastern Mediterranean civilizations fought against them and comes up with fair A fascinating look at the history of the Bronze Age collapse， one of the least-known but most pivotal periods in history。 Even though the invasions of the Sea Peoples were so devastating that there aren't even records of their proper name， and despite the passage of over thirty centuries and the disappearance of most of the historical record， Drews reviews the greater part of the known evidence of the battles that the eastern Mediterranean civilizations fought against them and comes up with fairly convincing theories to explain how so many nations vanished so suddenly during the 12th century BC， how the Egyptians eventually managed to stop them， and what the consequences were for military tactics and Western civilization as a whole。He begins briskly， with a review of the known evidence。 Archaeologists have discovered that around the end of the 12th century BC， many parts of the eastern Mediterranean experienced sudden population decline and epidemics of cities burned to the ground: Turkey， Cyprus， the entire coast of the Levant， Greece and the Aegean islands， Crete， and even parts of Mesopotamia up to the boundary of the Assyrian empire。 The only region that appears to have escaped relatively unscathed is what's now Egypt， but whatever happened was so catastrophic that it marks the end of the Bronze Age and the beginning of a long dark age lasting at least half a millennium in most of the area。 Prior to the calamity， powerful empires like the Hittites controlled large centralized states with strong， mobile militaries， and afterwards there was basically nothing left of virtually every culture anywhere near the Mediterranean coast: "Altogether the end of the Bronze Age was arguably the worst disaster in ancient history， even more calamitous than the collapse of the western Roman Empire。"Many theories have been proposed to explain this mass collapse - Drews covers theories of earthquakes， large-scale migrations， the introduction of iron weapons and armor， widespread drought， an increase in barbarian raids， and the all-encompassing "general systems collapse"。 Each is somewhat plausible， and Drews' contention is that the true answer is essentially a combination of most of the above， with a primary emphasis on changes in military tactics。 Much like the Mongols' use of heavy cavalry was so revolutionary as to render them nearly unstoppable for many decades across most of Eurasia， the Sea Peoples' use of heavy infantry caught almost every Mediterranean empire completely off guard。 At the time， infantry were used only for fighting small， disorganized bands of barbarians; the chariot， driven by a charioteer accompanied by an archer with a composite bow， was the unit of choice for serious wars between powerful states。 In ancient battles like Megiddo and Kadesh， they seem to have fulfilled a role vaguely similar to that of tanks in the North African front of World War 2 as fast-moving tactical shock units （it's funny how after thousands of years warfare in that part of the world can be so similar）。 Unlike in the classical era， where groups of heavy infantry like hoplites/phalanxes/legionaries were the decisive unit in state-to-state warfare， in the Bronze Age most societies organized their foot soldiers primarily into light infantry， and used them mostly against weaker barbarian tribes， in areas unsuitable for chariot warfare， or as auxiliaries and support in chariot warfare。That particular structure of forces says a lot， not only about what warfare was like， but also the limits of technology and the social structures of Bronze Age civilizations。 By the middle of the Iron Age chariots had essentially disappeared from the battlefield， mounted cavalry being a more efficient use of horse but also seemingly more effective in the supporting role so familiar from the infantry-focused wars of the Romans and Greeks。 In between was the Bronze Age collapse， and though hard evidence is frustratingly scanty， Drews is convinced that the invasions of the Sea Peoples， with their more advanced armor， javelins， and swords， were the catalyst for the disappearance of the chariot as a viable unit of warfare。 Without chariots， most states were essentially helpless before their assaults， and even the "lucky" Egyptians relied on some decisive naval victories to escape most of the damage。 While he's weirdly attached to the theory that the Sea Peoples were originally from Sardinia （given the behavior of later civilizations， it seems like the western Mediterranean would be a more pleasant place to pillage than the eastern）， his theory that most of the established cultures just couldn't withstand the Sea People's superior way of war seems solid。 Again， much like the Mongols were able to completely obliterate much larger and richer empires by virtue of better military prowess， it seems reasonable to think that the same thing could have happened in the same area in the Bronze Age （although the Egyptians managed to fight off the Mongols that time）。The book is written in a dry， scholarly tone， but there's a chill behind its descriptions of sacks， ruins， and conflict: were it not for Egypt's resistance to the Sea Peoples， what， if anything， would have eventually limited their depredations？ Unlike the Vikings or the Mongols， they didn't settle in most of the territories they came across， they just destroyed everything they touched。 If they had proceeded unchecked until they ran out of steam， we might never have known about them， and the long interregnum of civilization at the end of the Bronze Age might have been gone on for much longer。 I would have liked for him to have spent more time on the theory that the stories of the Trojan War are based in part on the Bronze Age collapse， and to have bothered to translate some primary source quotes from the original Italian， Ancient Greek， etc。， but otherwise this was an intriguing look at an irritatingly enigmatic period in world history。 。。。more
Tedopon
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Author sure likes to use the silly nomenclature Catastrophe （caps his） and wildly speculate， but it's an interesting read， nonetheless。There are a number of claims in here that have since been modified （book written in 1995） to reflect different findings since， but it's a pretty good work overall。 Still not sure about the overuse of capitalized Catastrophe （especially when the author readily admits numerous times throughout the text that there is scant evidence for a number of claims he makes）， Author sure likes to use the silly nomenclature Catastrophe （caps his） and wildly speculate， but it's an interesting read， nonetheless。There are a number of claims in here that have since been modified （book written in 1995） to reflect different findings since， but it's a pretty good work overall。 Still not sure about the overuse of capitalized Catastrophe （especially when the author readily admits numerous times throughout the text that there is scant evidence for a number of claims he makes）， or the arcane usage of "Dark Ages" which IMO doesn't really have a place in scholarly work post 1975。The main problem I had （and it made the difference between the 3 or 4 star rating）， was that a significant chunk of the book deals with military material culture and associated tactical considerations。 Drews spends about 1/4 of this section of the book explaining basically that "it's anybody's guess what the hell they were doing， really"。Still informative， and I enjoyed it。 。。。more
Marcus
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"The End of the Bronze Age" proposes that large scale destruction of large urban centres around eastern Mediterranean Sea that apparently took place around XIII-XII century BC occured because of sudden change in warfare styles。 More closely， Drews proposes that the event was caused directly by superiority of armies based on skirmish-based infantry equipped with javelins and swords over "national" armies of established kingsdoms where chariots were the dominating weapon platform。 In an effort to "The End of the Bronze Age" proposes that large scale destruction of large urban centres around eastern Mediterranean Sea that apparently took place around XIII-XII century BC occured because of sudden change in warfare styles。 More closely， Drews proposes that the event was caused directly by superiority of armies based on skirmish-based infantry equipped with javelins and swords over "national" armies of established kingsdoms where chariots were the dominating weapon platform。 In an effort to reach this conclusion， Drews makes a whole lot of loosely founded assumptions that fit his argument， but which I suspect will be regarded with suspicion by military historians。 For those reasons I would consider this book as most useful， if it is regarded as an illustration of how little is known about the transitional period between Bronze Age and Iron Age and how what we actually know can be used to support wide range of theories about civilizations of that time。 。。。more
Al
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Very good study of the end of the Bronze age， with influence of the Sea Peoples on the civilizations along the rim of the eastern Med。
Walt
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This was one of my most enjoyable books on the ancient world。 The focus is on warfare; but the wealth of the book was in explaining how socities rose and fell based on the changes in technology - the gradual changes between the Bronze and Iron Ages。
Sean
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a scholarly analysis of The Catastrophe at the end of the bronze age， c。 1200 BC。 The Catastrophe was a brief （decades long） burst of violent change in the ancient world that saw centuries-old kingdoms and scores of ancient urban centers destroyed。 The ancient order was destroyed， or at least changed dramatically， and only a lucky， happily located few （such as Egypt） emerged intact。 Even these lucky ones paid a significant price。 Scholars have argued for some time about what caused the violence， a scholarly analysis of The Catastrophe at the end of the bronze age， c。 1200 BC。 The Catastrophe was a brief （decades long） burst of violent change in the ancient world that saw centuries-old kingdoms and scores of ancient urban centers destroyed。 The ancient order was destroyed， or at least changed dramatically， and only a lucky， happily located few （such as Egypt） emerged intact。 Even these lucky ones paid a significant price。 Scholars have argued for some time about what caused the violence， and who was behind it。drews sets the stage by describing the state of material and urban culture in the levant and the mediterranean basin， and then proceeds to argue that earthquakes， drought， the advent of iron working， etc。 are insufficient to explain The Catastrophe。 instead， drews argues that changes in military technology， and more importantly in military practice， were the root cause of The Catastrophe。 his argument goes something like this:* typical bronze age powers relied in the main on chariotry for defense， and to maintain their grip on their kingdoms。* chariots were not used as battle taxis， nor were they platforms for lancers， swordsmen or the like。 rather， they were used as mobile archery platforms for composite bowmen。* infantry played a supporting role in this form of warfare。 they acted as screens for damaged chariots fleeing the field， guards for encampments， and played a prominent role in sieges。 they were also used to engage barbarian guerillas and "hill people"。 but warfare between civilized states was a contest between large groups of chariots。* around the time of The Catastrophe， someone had the bright idea to use swarms of lightly-armed infantrymen to confront the chariot corps。 warriors lightly-armored and using javelins， spears and the new （to most） naue type II hack-n-slash swords were very effective in this anti-chariot role。* with their expensive， difficult to maintain chariot corps rendered impotent， the powerful bronze age kingdoms， traditionally weak infantry powers， were suddenly in a very exposed position。 unfortunately for them， everyone figured that out pretty quickly。* best guess is that most of the destroyed kingdoms -- the hittites， the trojans， the mycenaeans， the ugaritians， etc。 -- fell to the rural peoples， the "hill peoples" who lived on the periphery of these plains kingdoms。 they were wealthy and weak， and the hill people were able to turn the tables on them for the first time in centuries。the book is pretty demanding -- dense， scholarly prose， copius footnotes， frequent untranslated passages in italian， german， french。 but it's worth the slog。 the argument is tight and convincing， and it's easy enough to tell where his weaknesses lie。 highly recommended， though not good beach reading （hence the four stars; couldn't dance to it）。also recommend "Chariot" by arthur cotterell， as he takes up where drews leaves off re: the role of the chariot in bronze age warfare （by no means a settled subject）。 。。。more
Darcie
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Whatever happened to the Bronze Age？ Find out！
Jamey
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